formally proposed by the scientists of Columbia's Program on Information and Resources (PIR) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in May 1994 and emerged in December 1997 in the Kyoto Protocol (see, e.g., Chichilnisky [2] ).
Another example of a privately produced public good is the total amount of knowledge in society. In idealized terms this can be represented by products (e.g., software) that can be duplicated at no cost, so the good is not rival in consumption. Knowledge is often privately produced, thus satisfying the definition of privately produced public good that is provided here. In the case of knowledge, the traders' property rights could be interpreted as rights to use a certain number of licences for knowledge products (e.g., software; see Chichilnisky [3] ). In all cases the markets considered here are competitive throughout.
Markets with Privately Produced Public Goods
We use the model of chapter 3 of this book. A competitive market has J Ն 2 traders, one public good denoted a ʦ R, for example, the concentration of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) in the atmosphere, and a private good denoted c ʦ R. The property rights of the trader j, restrict the amount of carbon that the a , j trader has the right to emit at no cost. More rights can be bought or sold in a competitive market. Each trader produces an amount of the private good ʦ R, c * j chosing an input of the public good that maximizes profits. Formally,
where p is the relative price of a, c j ϭ f j (a j ) and ‫ץ‬c j /‫ץ‬a j Ͻ 0. Private goods are the numeraire, that is p c ϵ 1, and represents the amount of carbon (a Ϫ a ) j j emitted by trader j to produce private goods over and above its initial rights. Each trader chooses his or her consumption of private and public goods a* c *, j ʦ so as to maximize utility 
that is, the value of consumption of private and public goods equals the value of production.
In a competitive market equilibrium all markets clear:
and J J c * ϭ f (a*).
Efficiency Conditions
This section derives efficiency conditions for the allocation and provision of privately produced public goods. The classic Lindahl-Bowen-Samuelson conditions for Pareto efficiency in the supply of classic public goods do not in principle apply here because the public good a is privately produced: Here each producer has different production functions, and maximizes profits.
Proposition 1 Efficiency requires that for every trader j, the sum over all traders of the marginal rates of substitution between the private and the public good should equal the corresponding rate of transformation In a competif Ј . j tive market, this rate of transformation must equal the relative price of the privately produced public good.
Proof. By definition an allocation is Pareto efficient if there is no other feasible allocation that makes everyone as well off and someone strictly better off. By definition, therefore, at such an allocation each trader maximizes his or her utility given the (fixed) levels of utility of all others. Formally, for the J traders, a Pareto-efficient allocation [c 1 ,
solves the problem
where w(c j ) ϭ (c j ) and ϭ (c j ) ϭ a.
To obtain an optimum, one considers the so-called Lagrangian expression {u 1 [c j ,Optimizing (13.1), one obtains for each trader j Remark 1 Observe that expression (13.4) is independent of the units of measurement and it does not depend on the weights l j .
